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I.

INTRODUCTION

1

The felony-murder rule challenges traditional notions of
culpability by allowing courts to find a homicide where there is no
2
corresponding homicidal intent. At early common law, the rule
† J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., English,
Boston College, 1997.
1. “Felony murder” is a “[m]urder that occurs during the commission of a
felony (esp. a serious one).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (7th ed. 1999).
2. See State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 881 (Minn. 1992) (citing 2 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5 (1986))
(describing the felony murder rule’s function as “imputing malice where there was
no specific intent to kill”); 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 64 (2003) (explaining that the
effect of a felony-murder statute is to impute malice). Traditionally, culpability
has required intent. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
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broadly held that a death resulting from the commission of a felony
3
is murder. The criminal intent applicable to the underlying felony
is said to transfer to the homicide; thus, an accidental death
4
becomes a murder.
5
The doctrine has long been controversial. The public, of
course, has little tolerance for those who would intentionally
commit a felony, and an unwarranted death without question
6
deserves punishment. But the conclusion that any death caused
while attempting or committing a felony rises to murder is a brutal
and illogical violation of what has been described as perhaps the
most basic principle of criminal law: “criminal liability for causing a
particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable
7
mental state in respect to that result.” Courts tend to avoid
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil.
Id.
3. State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 2003) (citing Rudolph J.
Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763,
765 (1999) (quoting SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 947 (George Chase ed., 4th ed. 1938)).
4. 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 147 (15th ed. 1993) (“In
the typical case of felony murder, there is no malice in ‘fact’ with respect to the
homicide; the malice is supplied by the ‘law.’”); cf. Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law
Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1919 (1986) [hereinafter Reconceptualization] (pointing out that within the concept of homicide, with the exception of
manslaughter, only felony murder requires no specific mental element). The
Minnesota Criminal Code, for example, classifies five types of homicide. See MINN.
STAT. §§ 609.185-.205 (2002).
Each type describes a particular mental
requirement.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2002) (requiring
premeditation and intent); MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2002) (requiring
intent without premeditation).
5. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980) (“Felony murder
has never been a static, well-defined rule at common law, but throughout its
history has been characterized by judicial reinterpretation to limit the harshness of
the application of the rule.”).
6. The standard definition of a felony offense as a crime punishable by a
year or more in prison testifies to the public will as expressed through the
legislature. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 2 (2002) (“[S]entence of
imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed.”). See generally David
Crump & Susan Waite Crump, Articles in Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359 nn.18-19 (1985) (describing the BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 4-5 (1983), where the public was asked to rank the
severity of crimes). The author notes that some felony murders including rape- or
robbery-homicides ranked higher than other intentional family killings. Id. at 364.
7. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting Bernard E. Gegan, Criminal Homicide
in the Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L. FORUM 565, 586 (1966)). The court
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applying the rule where circumstances permit, and the variety of
judicial and legislative limitations testify to a growing discomfort
9
with the harshness of the rule.
Minnesota is among the states that have decided to limit the
10
application of the felony-murder rule. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has, through its power of common law interpretation, wisely
enunciated a rule that limits the reach of the doctrine to felonies
11
that are inherently dangerous to life. The result is a rule that is
not entirely consistent with the broader demands of the statute.
After settling into a consistent course of rulings, the court was once
12
again called upon to grapple with the controversial doctrine.
Although on its face the Minnesota statute applies to all but a
13
few felonies, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes only
14
predicate felonies that involve a “special danger to human life.”
In Minnesota, determining whether a felony involves a “special
danger to human life” is critical; only those felonies that involve
15
such a danger can support a felony-murder charge.
Determining whether a felony involves a special danger to
human life requires consideration of two factors: (1) the nature of
further reasoned, “[w]hile it is understandable that little compassion may be felt
for the criminal whose innocent victim dies, this does not justify ignoring
principles underlying our system of criminal law.” Id. at 318.
8. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 70 (3d ed. 1982).
9. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316.
10. Most jurisdictions have limited the application of the rule either by
statute or common law. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2
cmt. 6 (1980) (summarizing major limitations); TORCIA, supra note 4, § 149
(describing a variety of limitations).
11. While Minnesota Statutes section 609.19 applies to all felonies (excepting
specific crimes for treatment as murder in the first degree under Minnesota
Statutes section 609.185 (2002)), the Minnesota Supreme Court only gives effect to
the rule where the felony is inherently dangerous. See State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d
752, 754 (Minn. 1980).
12. Since Nunn, the court has applied the same standard for determining
which felonies involve some special danger to human life. See State v. Meyers, 627
N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 2001) (finding danger to life in the circumstances
surrounding obstruction of justice); State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn.
1992) (reiterating abstract and circumstances as the proper test); Matter of
Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 729-30 (Minn. 1984) (finding danger to life in
damage to property by shooting a rifle into a dwelling).
13. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subd. 2 (2002). The Minnesota rule applies to all
felonies except particular instances of criminal sexual conduct with force or
violence, drive-by shootings, and certain crimes committed in violation of an order
for protection. Id.
14. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 753.
15. Id. at 754.
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the felony in the abstract (considering only the elements of the
offense with a view to their inherent dangerousness), and (2) the
manner in which the felony was committed (taking account of the
16
particular facts and circumstances of the offense).
Until recently, the courts focused largely on the facts and
circumstances of the felony under consideration, an approach that
17
tended to favor application of the felony-murder rule. In 2003,
the Minnesota Supreme Court revisited the doctrine in State v.
18
Anderson, a case that involved felon in possession and possession of a
19
stolen firearm. In Anderson, the court focused its analysis exclusively
on the felonies in the abstract, ignoring the more dangerous
20
circumstances in which the felonies were committed. The court
made this transition without explanation and without providing
21
guidance for apportioning weight between the two considerations.
This Note first briefly examines the history of the felony22
murder doctrine both generally and in Minnesota. Second, this
Note describes the decision and analysis in State v. Anderson, the
23
latest case in Minnesota to deal with the felony-murder doctrine.

16. See id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 547 (West Pub. Co. 1972)).
17. By including more activity within the scope of the analysis, the potential
for finding danger increases. The opposite is also true. Viewing a felony only in
the abstract tends to limit application of the felony-murder rule. Compare People v.
Patterson, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989) (holding that furnishing cocaine is not
inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract) with State v. Randolph, 676
S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984) (upholding heroin distribution as a proper predicate
when viewed as committed).
18. MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2002) (prohibiting those adjudicated
delinquent of a crime of violence from possessing a firearm).
19. MINN. STAT. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2002) (describing felony possession of a
stolen firearm); MINN. STAT. § 609.52, subd. 3(1) (2002) (prescribing
punishment).
20. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). The court did not
discuss its reasons for viewing the felony only in the abstract. See id. One possible
explanation is that the court narrowly construed the scope of the felony. By
limiting the time that the felony is considered to be occurring, the court can claim
to have taken account of the entire felony. Compare State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d
518, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the sale of cocaine ended at the
point of transaction so death occurred outside of the felony) with State v. Murphy,
380 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 1986) (finding that a killing which took place after a
rape was within the “same continuous criminal act”). See generally Erwin S. Barbre,
Annotation, What Constitutes Termination of Felony for Purpose of Felony-Murder Rule,
58 A.L.R.3d 851 (1974).
21. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
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Third, this Note concludes that in an effort to reach the right
result, the court misapplied its previous precedent and left the
24
lower courts with no clear standard for guidance in the future.
Finally, this Note suggests that a workable standard might be found
in limiting the application of the rule to deaths that occur in
25
furtherance of the felony.
II. GENERAL HISTORY
The original formulation of the felony-murder rule stated,
without limitation, that a death caused while perpetrating or
26
attempting a felony is murder. The doctrine was mechanical and
27
made no concessions for deaths that were caused by accident.
Death did not even have to be a foreseeable consequence of the
28
crime. One commentator framed the operation of the rule most
29
The unique and
starkly: “[A] felony + a killing = a murder.”
controversial aspect of this rule is that it regards the commission of
30
a felony as conclusive evidence of homicidal malice.
Legal historians agree that the rule appeared first in
31
commentaries rather than judicial decisions, but the precise
32
origins of the doctrine are unclear. Commentators often trace
the first manifestation of the felony-murder rule to Lord Dacres
33
Lord Dacres and his hunting party agreed to
case in 1535.
34
trespass in a park to hunt and to kill anyone who opposed them.

24. See infra Part IV.A-C.
25. See infra Part IV.D.
26. See M. Susan Doyle, Note, People v. Patterson: California’s Second Degree
Felony-Murder Rule at “The Brink of Logical Absurdity,” 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 195, 199
(1990) (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 7.5 (1986)).
27. George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 413
(1980-81).
28. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 67-68.
29. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of
the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1994).
30. See Fletcher, supra note 27, at 415-16; People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361,
1366 n.15 (Cal. 1971) (“The thing done having proceeded from a corrupt mind, is
to be viewed the same, whether the corruption is of one particular form or
another.” ) (citing People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 (1874)).
31. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 764 (1999).
32. Id.
33. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980).
34. Id.
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35

One of the Lord’s party killed a gamekeeper who confronted him.
Although not physically present at the site of the killing, Lord
36
Dacres was also held liable for the killing. Even though this case
37
has been presented as one involving the felony-murder rule, its
holding was based on the theory of “constructive presence,” not on
38
the felony-murder rule. Because the hunting party had expressly
agreed to kill anyone who opposed them, there was no need for the
39
imputation of malice.
Whatever the original source of the rule, “the doctrine gained
prominence with Sir Edward Coke’s statement of the rule in
40
1797.”
If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A. meaning to
steale a deere in the park of B., shooteth at the deere, and
by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a
bush: this is murder, for that the act was unlawful,
although A. had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not
41
of him.
This rule operates in direct opposition to the fundamental
42
principle of criminal law that liability ought to reflect culpability.
A crime is typically composed of a particularized type of criminal
43
intent coupled with an act. When the felony-murder doctrine was
first being applied, the idea of matching a specific mindset to a
44
particular crime was not nearly as developed as it is today. Judges
focused more attention on the result of the felony than on the
45
intent of the actor who produced the result. The felony-murder

35. Id. at 308.
36. Id. at 307-08.
37. Id. at 308-09.
38. Id. at 308.
39. Id.
40. See Michael J. Roman, “Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends, Once More”:
A Call to Reevaluate the Felony-Murder Doctrine in Wisconsin in the Wake of State v. Oimen
and State v. Rivera, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 785, 828 n.15 (1994).
41. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THIRD PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (1797) and noting that Coke’s statements
have been criticized as lacking authority).
42. Doyle, supra note 26, at 195; State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885
(Minn. 1992) (levels of criminal responsibility are based on the actor’s intent).
43. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 1 (5th ed.
1995).
44. See Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1435. The early conception of mens rea
necessarily was “vague and imprecise; any badness or wrongfulness qualified.” Id.
45. See e.g., Gerber, supra note 31, at 765 (describing theory of “tainting,”
whereby “if one person caused the death of another, then the killing upset the
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doctrine reflected the idea that “the defendant, because he is
committing a felony, is by hypothesis, a bad person, so that we
should not worry too much about the difference between the bad
46
results he intends and the bad results he brings about.”
Modern criminal codes distinguish among several degrees of
criminal intent. The Model Penal Code for instance, recognizes
four types of mental states associated with liability: purpose,
47
As criminal law has
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.
evolved, “courts and commentators have come to recognize that
the intent to commit a felony is not equivalent to the other mental
48
states associated with murder.” The doctrine has attracted vast
amounts of scholarly criticism, and many courts have concluded
that “the felony murder doctrine expresses a highly artificial
concept that deserves no extension beyond its required
49
application.”
Where courts feel compelled to justify use of the rule, it is most
50
often explained as a deterrent against the commission of felonies
or against killing negligently or accidentally while engaged in a
51
felony. The value of the rule as a deterrent has also been hotly
52
contested. Commentators point out that accidental killings, by
their very nature, are neither planned nor susceptible to
53
avoidance.
Opponents of the rule further contend that the

moral order [and] [s]ome legal response was necessary to . . . expunge the taint”).
46. John S. Huster, The California Courts Stray From the Felony in Felony Murder:
What is “in Perpetration” of the Crime?, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 739, 745 (1994) (quoting 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(e) (1986)); see also
Fletcher, supra note 27, at 427 (“If there is a principle . . . it is that the wrongdoer
must run the risk that things will turn out worse than she expects.”).
47. Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1480 n.24 (discussing Model Penal Code
section 2.02).
48. Tamu Sudduth, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder
Punishments, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1306 (1984).
49. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5(h) (2d ed. 1986)
(quoting People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1966)).
50. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 451 (1985).
51. See id. at 450; see, e.g., State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 882-84 (Minn.
1992) (holding that certain felonious conduct risks death and warrants
punishment).
52. See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1448; Crump & Crump, supra
note 6, at 369 (defending deterrence as a rationale for the rule).
53. T.B. Macaulay, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners,
Note M, 64-65 (1837), excerpted in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES CASES AND MATERIALS 472-73 (6th ed. 1995). To
punish one who while committing a felony caused a death by pure accident gains
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average felon is unlikely to know about what is basically a rule of
evidence regarding a defendant’s mindset during the commission
54
of a crime.
Historically, the harshness of the felony-murder doctrine was
tempered by the limited number and extreme nature of the acts
55
that were recognized as felonies. The rule applied to the most
serious crimes within the social context of the time: “homicide,
mayhem, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, larceny, prison breach,
56
and rescue of a felon.”
Both felonies and murders were
57
punishable by death. At trial, with the same result pending, it
58
made no difference under which theory one was prosecuted.
The rule, then, was not justified as a means to increase the
penalty for a felony. Instead, commentators hold that it was used
to punish homicides that occurred in the course of an attempted
59
felony.
Because an attempted felony was punishable only as a
misdemeanor, “the felony murder rule allowed the court to punish
a person who attempted a felony and failed, in the same manner as
60
if he had succeeded.”
61
In England, the application of the rule was limited until 1957
62
when it was eliminated completely. As the number of recognized
felonies in America has grown, the potential for creating murderers

nothing for the protection of life. Id. at 472. If the punishment for the felony is
too light, then the punishment should be increased. Id. at 473. Treating the felon
who did the same thing, with the same intention with no more risk of causing
death, taking no less care to avoid it, is capricious. Id.
54. Crump & Crump, supra note 6, at 370 (“Deterrence is the policy most
often recognized in the cases. Scholars, however, tend to dismiss this rationale,
using such arguments as the improbability that felons will know the law.”).
55. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 764 (“Under early English law, felonies and
murders were both punishable by death.”).
56. State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (listing
common law felonies).
57. Id.; Roth & Sundby, supra note 50, at 450.
58. See Huster, supra note 46, at 744.
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, vol. I, § 210.2 cmt. 6
n.74 (1980) (“The primary use of the felony-murder rule . . . was to deal with a
homicide that occurred in furtherance of an attempted felony that failed.”).
60. Id.; Roth & Sundby, supra note 50, at 450-51 (explaining the purpose for
the rule is vague and deterrence justification is logically flawed).
61. English courts created two general limitations: death had to be the
natural and probable consequence of the felony, and the felony charged had to be
violent in nature. Richard Brooks Holcomb, Predicate Offenses For First Degree Felony
Murder in Virginia, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 561, 571 (2000).
62. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 64 n.38 (citing HOMICIDE ACT OF 1957,
5&6 Eliz. II, c. 11, sec. 1).
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out of relatively minor offenders has caused courts to limit the
63
effect of the doctrine in a variety of ways.
A. Limitations on the Application of the Felony-Murder Rule
There is no uniformity among the states with respect to felonymurder. This is partially because legislatures have promulgated a
variety of statutes, but also because the judiciary has imposed many
64
common law limitations. Comments to the Model Penal Code
describe several of the methods that courts have used to limit the
65
These restrictions
felonies to which the rule can be applied.
include: requiring that the crime, abstractly considered, be
66
inherently dangerous to human life; that the defendant’s conduct
67
in committing the felony involve a foreseeable risk to life; that the
68
felony be independent of the homicide; that the act of killing be
69
in furtherance of the felony; and giving a narrow construction to
the period of time during which the felony is in the process of
70
commission.
All of these restrictions are aimed at avoiding
situations where applying the rule would lead to harsh results.
One of the earliest and most logical limitations to the felonymurder doctrine is the requirement that the felony be inherently
71
dangerous to life. In order to justify a murder conviction, a felon
should at least have done something dangerous. The goal of
deterrence can only be served where a felon can foresee danger in
the commission of the felony and modify his actions in light of the

63. See 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 45 (1991 & Supp. 2004) (citing State v. Forsman,
260 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1977)). See generally LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 14.5(b)
(describing limitations on felony-murder rule).
64. Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1434 (“Most American jurisdictions have a
restricted form of the rule that applies only when a felon acting in furtherance of
one of a certain, limited group of felonies commits a lethal act that kills another
human being.”).
65. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980)
(summarizing major limitations).
66. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 555 (Cal. 1989). For
application of the felony-murder rule, most courts require that [a felony not
specifically listed in the statute] be inherently dangerous. TORCIA, supra note 4, §
148.
67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (Mass. 1982).
68. See, e.g., People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969).
69. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 495 (Pa. 1958).
70. See, e.g., State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
71. Most courts limit the felony-murder rule to inherently dangerous felonies.
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 65.
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72

impending risk to life.
As early as 1887, in the case of Regina v. Serné, the rule was
limited by judicial instruction to situations deemed inherently
73
dangerous. In that case, a man stood accused of arson for setting
fire to his home and burning his wife and children to death in
74
order to cheat an insurance company on the claim.
The
presiding judge suggested to the jury that, “instead of [allowing all
felonies to support felony murder] it would be reasonable to say
that any act known to be dangerous to life and likely in itself to
75
cause death . . . should be murder.”
Today, the majority of
jurisdictions recognize inherent danger as a proper qualification
76
for treatment under the rule.
In determining which felonies involve a danger to human life,
two competing views have evolved. The first view looks only to the
elements of the felony in the abstract, and the dangerousness is
77
determined by the nature of the crime. A theft of property, for
example, requires only that one take possession of something that
78
does not belong to him with an intent to keep it. When viewed in
the abstract, a theft does not create an unacceptable risk of death
79
to justify imposition of the rule. The second view maintains that
the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission should be
80
included in the analysis. If the theft involved returning stolen

72. Sudduth, supra note 48, at 1305 n.31; People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894,
897 (Cal. 1984) (“We formulated this standard because ‘if the felony is not
inherently dangerous, it is highly improbable that the potential felon will be
deterred; he will not anticipate that injury or death might arise solely from the fact
that he will commit the felony.’”).
73. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES CASES AND MATERIALS 468-70 (6th ed. 1995) (citing Regina v. Serné, 16
Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (1887)).
74. Id. at 468.
75. Id. at 470.
76. It is critical to note, however, that even when limited to predicate felonies
that are inherently dangerous, the rule still operates to turn what is essentially
negligent or reckless activity into an intentional crime. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980).
77. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 66. In People v. Williams, California’s
highest court ruled that the determination of danger is to be drawn from the
“elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular ‘facts’ of the case.” 406
P.2d 647, 650 n.5 (Cal. 1965).
78. A theft can occur under a variety of circumstances. See MINN. STAT. §
609.52 (2002 & Supp. 2003).
79. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 357 (Cal. 1966); LAFAVE, supra
note 49, § 14.5 (theft felonies in abstract do not involve danger to life).
80. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 66.
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merchandise for cash, while the felon was armed with a loaded
firearm and under the influence of multiple narcotics, the result
would be different in a jurisdiction that takes into consideration
81
the facts of the case.
The method employed plays a major and often determinative
82
role in the outcome of the test. Proponents of the circumstances
test argue that the standard provides a more accurate measurement
83
Opponents insist that the
of the danger as it actually existed.
existence of a victim makes objective determination of danger
84
difficult. Every felony that ends in death will naturally have been
85
done in a dangerous manner.
B. Recent History in Minnesota
On its face, the current Minnesota statute on second-degree
unintentional murder applies to all but a few felonies. The statute
states in pertinent part:
[W]hoever does either of the following is guilty of murder
in the second degree . . . (1) causes the death of a human
being, without intent to effect the death of any person,
while committing or attempting to commit a felony
offense other than [particular sexual offenses and drive-by
81. State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Minn. 1996).
82. Compare People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369-70 (Cal. 1971) (holding
that possession of a firearm is not inherently dangerous when viewed in the
abstract) with State v. Goodseal, 553 P.2d 279, 285 (Kan. 1976) (holding that
possession of a firearm is inherently dangerous under the circumstances of the
commission).
83. “[I]f the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons
accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct, then it
would seem to make little difference whether the felony committed was dangerous
by its very nature or merely dangerous as committed in the particular case.”
LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 14.5(b).
84. Explaining the decision to view felonies in the abstract only, the
California Supreme Court stated:
This form of analysis is compelled because there is a killing in every case
where the rule might potentially be applied. If in such circumstances a
court were to examine the particular facts of the case prior to
establishing whether the underlying felony is inherently dangerous, the
court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable despite any
unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an
application: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead
inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is exceptionally
hazardous. We continue to resist such unjustifiable bootstrapping.
People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 897-98 (Cal. 1984).
85. See id.
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86

shootings].
Before 1981, the statute had only been applicable to felonies
committed or attempted “upon or affecting the person whose
87
death was caused.” A felony not committed directly upon “the
88
person” would not qualify for felony-murder treatment.
The
effect of the language was to eliminate pure property crimes from
89
the domain of the statute. Minnesota courts have interpreted that
limiting language as a means of “isolat[ing] for special treatment
90
those felonies that involve some special danger to human life.”
After 1981, when the language was removed, Minnesota retained
the requirement that predicate felonies involve some “special
91
danger to human life.”
In 1980, Minnesota adopted its current framework for
resolving whether a felony is inherently dangerous and thereby
capable of supporting a murder conviction. In State v. Nunn, the
court adopted the two-part special danger test that called for
potential predicate felonies to be viewed both in the abstract and in
92
the context of how they were committed. Significantly, the court
gave no explicit guidance on how much weight was to be accorded
93
to either consideration. Beginning with Nunn, however, the court
has made a series of decisions that appear to indicate that lack of
danger in the abstract can be overcome by dangerous
94
circumstances in the commission of the offense.
The Nunn decision involved three young men who unlawfully
95
entered a home intending to steal property. They were surprised
96
by the resident of the home and beat him severely. The “beating,
while insufficient to cause death to a healthy person,” caused the

86. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2002).
87. State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666
N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003) (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(2) advisory
committee’s cmt. (West 1987)).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 370.
90. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 699 (quoting State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 753
(Minn. 1980)).
91. Id.
92. 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980).
93. See id. (stating only that the approach adopted considers both elements
and circumstances).
94. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
95. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 753.
96. Id.
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97

resident to die of a heart attack. In Nunn, the court reasoned that
burglary of a dwelling, although largely a crime against property,
“always carries with it the possibility of violence and therefore some
98
special risks to human life.”
Thus, although burglary may not
have been dangerous in the abstract, the fact that the burglary was
committed on a dwelling, with an accompanying assault, created a
99
special danger to life.
In the 1983 case State v. Back, random shots were fired upon
100
cars, streetlights, and buildings using a high-powered rifle.
The
felony-murder rule was applied and predicated upon felony
damage to property, a crime that viewed in the abstract does not
101
jeopardize lives in its commission.
In deciding Back, the court
held the defendant’s conduct involved a “high degree of risk of
102
Thus, even a true property crime committed
bodily harm.”
under dangerous circumstances may involve a danger to life and
103
support a felony-murder charge.
Thirteen years later, in State v. Cole, the court reached a similar
104
conclusion.
The defendant, under the influence of multiple
drugs and carrying a loaded gun, entered a department store
105
intending to return stolen merchandise for money. The crime of
theft, when exhibiting a danger to life as committed, was an
106
appropriate predicate for felony-murder.
In all three supreme court rulings, the dangerous
circumstances of the predicate felony proved to be dispositive, and
the rule was applied. In 2003, the Anderson court arrived at a
different result.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 754.
99. See id.
100. 341 N.W.2d 273, 274 (Minn. 1983).
101. Id. at 277.
102. Id. at 276 (quoting the district court).
103. Id. The court noted that this holding was particularly significant because
despite a legislative amendment that effectively allowed the felony-murder rule to
encompass property offenses, the previous limitation that a special danger to
human life be present was not abandoned. State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 699
(Minn. 2003) (discussing 40 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195 1963 advisory committee’s
cmt. (West 2003)).
104. 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996).
105. Id. at 46-47.
106. Id. at 53.
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III. THE ANDERSON DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1998, Jerret Lee Anderson was convicted of riot in the
107
Thereafter, possession of a firearm would be a
second degree.
108
felony offense for Anderson.
On February 26, 2002, Anderson
visited Blake Rogers and a third party at Rogers’s house in
109
As the three were together in Rogers’s bedroom,
Minneapolis.
Anderson showed both men a twelve-gauge shotgun that he
110
claimed he had stolen. Next, Anderson passed the gun briefly to
111
his two companions. The gun was missing its stock, and all three
112
men noted that the gun was loaded.
While Rogers bent to load
113
compact discs into his stereo, Anderson pointed the gun at him.
114
Following Rogers’s death,
The gun discharged, killing Rogers.
the State charged Anderson with murder in the third-degree and
115
second-degree felony-murder.
The district court dismissed the felony-murder charge for lack
116
of probable cause.
The district court erroneously compared the
possession of a firearm in Anderson to the felony sale of cocaine in
117
118
State v. Aarsvold, an earlier appellate court decision. In Aarsvold,
the court considered the sale to be finished after the exchange of
money and drugs, and the death that followed was not considered
119
part of the felony.
Comparing Anderson to Aarsvold, the district
court concluded that while both involved a dangerous situation,
120
neither involved an inherent danger to life.
The district court
107. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 698 n.3. The adjudication was pursuant to MINN.
STAT. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2002 & Supp. 2003). Id.
108. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subds. 1(b), 2 (2002 & Supp. 2003)).
109. Id. at 697.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The district court found that neither felony possession charge was a
proper predicate offense for felony murder. Id. (describing the procedural
history).
117. 376 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
118. State v. Anderson, No. 02-2918, Dist. Ct. Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss
at 5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2002).
119. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d at 523.
120. State v. Anderson, No. 02016378, Dist. Ct. Order and Mem. of Law at 6
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did not address the fact that while the felony distribution of drugs
may have ended at the point of sale, the possession in Anderson was
121
still “occurring” at the time of the homicide.
122
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision.
The State noted what it viewed as the district court’s unwarranted
hostility toward application of the rule and the court’s “fail[ure] to
even mention that [Anderson] aimed the weapon at the
123
The defense argued that Anderson’s conduct was
decedent.”
merely reckless and deserved the district court’s lesser charge of
124
third-degree murder. The court of appeals looked at the totality
of the circumstances and found that “where a stockless firearm is
pointed at another and discharged,” either felony can be a
125
predicate for felony-murder.
Anderson then petitioned the
126
Minnesota Supreme Court for review.
B. The Court’s Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
127
First, the court rejected the State’s argument that “the
decision.
facts of the offense, as opposed to the abstract elements of the
128
predicate crime,” determine whether a felony involves a special
129
danger to human life. The court insisted that in addition to the
circumstances test, it had also consistently viewed the elements of
130
the felony in the abstract as a separate factor within its analysis. A

(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2002).
121. See id.
122. State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666
N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
123. Appellant’s Brief and App. at 7, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043).
124. Respondent’s Brief and App. at 6, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043).
125. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 372.
126. State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
127. Id. at 702.
128. Appellant’s Brief and App. at 7, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043).
129. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701 n.6 (rejecting the State’s argument); see
Appellant’s Brief and App. at 4, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043) (argument in full).
The State could have been correct.
Depending upon how broadly the
circumstances are defined, they could well encompass the idea of the felony in the
abstract. In fact, the State argued that whether a felony is “dangerous in the
abstract is irrelevant under the totality of the circumstances test.” Anderson, 654
N.W.2d at 370.
130. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. The court declined to consider only the
circumstances of the felony. The court reasoned that every felony that ends with a
death would necessarily have been committed in a particularly dangerous way. Id.
at 701 n.6. This same argument has been presented in California as the
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closer look at Nunn, Back, and Cole, the cases relied upon by the
majority for this proposition, reveals how little weight the court had
131
actually accorded the abstract test in the past.
Second, having noted the existence of the abstract test, the
court declared that there is “nothing about a felon’s possession of a
firearm, or of a stolen firearm—in the abstract—that in and of itself
132
involves a special danger to human life.”
The court
acknowledged that felons with firearms create a “dangerous
133
situation.”
But, the court continued, possession neither
“require[s] an act of violence” nor is “death . . . the natural and
134
Finally, the court
probable consequence” of the offense.
concluded that “[b]ecause [a] felon in possession of a firearm and
possession of a stolen firearm are not dangerous in the abstract,
these predicate felonies fail the special danger to human life
135
standard.”
Thus, the court dismissed the charge of felony136
murder.
Dissenting, Justice Gilbert called upon the majority to include
the circumstances of Anderson’s possession within their analysis,
stating that “[t]his is precisely the especially dangerous situation
137
that the legislature [intended to cover under the statute.]”
The
gun was stolen, loaded, illegally possessed, pointed at the victim’s
138
head, and ultimately discharged.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ANDERSON DECISION
As a matter of policy, the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately
came to the right result in holding that neither possession of a
stolen firearm nor felony possession should support a charge of
justification for foreclosing consideration of the circumstances surrounding the
felony entirely. See supra text accompanying note 84.
131. See State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996) (involving circumstances of
theft control); State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1983) (involving
circumstances of damage to property control); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752
(Minn. 1980) (involving circumstances of burglary control over elements in the
abstract).
132. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. California courts have employed the same
standard and reached similar conclusions. See People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361
(Cal. 1971).
133. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701.
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 702 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
138. See id.
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felony-murder. Current Minnesota law, however, required the
139
Instead of explicitly changing the law, the
opposite conclusion.
limited reasoning that the court provided in Anderson only served to
140
obfuscate what had before been well-settled principles.
A. Propriety of Result
In Anderson, the Minnesota Supreme Court wisely refused to
include possession of a stolen firearm and felony possession in the
141
First, the
list of offenses that can be punished as felony-murder.
court made a critical and just distinction between the use of a
142
firearm and the possession of a firearm.
As the appellant’s brief
to the court aptly noted, possession of the stolen firearm “did not
become a special danger to human life until the firearm was
143
pointed at Blake Rogers.”
It required a separate act that cannot
be fairly characterized as the manner in which the firearm was
possessed.
Second, there is a measurable difference between the quality
144
of mens rea required for second-degree murder (outside of the
felony-murder context) and that required for the possession
145
offenses at issue in Anderson.
This discrepancy is particularly
acute where the underlying felony is a “status crime,” based directly
146
This
on a defendant’s commission of a previous crime.

139. See infra Part IV.B.
140. See infra Part IV.C.
141. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701.
142. Id. at 700.
143. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 7, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043) (“It is the
blending of these two concepts (possessing a stolen firearm and placing the
firearm close to the decedent’s head) . . . that permits the conclusion [that the
felony was inherently dangerous to human life].”). The court did not specifically
address the argument, but its agreement is implicit in the distinction the court
drew between possession of a firearm and its use. See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701.
144. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 999 (defining “mens rea” as “[t]he state of mind
that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had
when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness”).
145. In Minnesota, second-degree murder requires “intent.” See MINN. STAT. §
609.19, subd. 1 (2002). Intent “means that the actor either has a purpose to do
the thing or cause the result specified or believes the act, if successful, will cause
that result.” MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2002). Possession, in contrast,
requires no particular mental state. See MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2002)
(not requiring a specific mens rea).
146. A status crime “consists not in proscribed action or inaction, but in the
accused’s having a certain personal condition or being a person of a specified
character.” U.S. v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D. Mass. 1998) (quoting
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discrepancy militates against application of the felony-murder
147
The California Supreme Court argued similarly that it is
rule.
illogical to maintain “that the presence or absence of a felony
conviction on a person’s past record [could be] the controlling
148
factor as to whether a homicide was committed with malice.”
Third, the homicide in Anderson was not caused by an act that
was in furtherance of the felony. The discharge of the gun did not
make the gun more stolen or Anderson’s possession less lawful.
Although Minnesota law has not explicitly articulated such a
requirement, the application of the felony-murder rule in this case
would “eliminate[] the proximate cause requirement and allow[]
the state virtually unlimited discretion to invoke the felony-murder
149
rule.”
Anderson’s use of the gun did nothing to advance his
150
unlawful possession.
Finally, simply removing possession from the domain of the
felony-murder rule does not diminish the protections provided
151
against use of a firearm.
Anderson, like other felons who misuse
152
firearms, will still be called upon to answer for his actions.
This
decision only removes the unwarranted conclusion that Anderson
intentionally killed Rogers and places that decision back in the
153
hands of the jury.
Strangely, these substantive arguments were largely ignored
154
when the court explained its reasoning. In their place, the court
substituted the conclusion that because the felonies “are not
dangerous in the abstract” they cannot support a felony-murder

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (6th ed. 1990)).
147. Cf. Reconceptualization, supra note 4, at 1920 (identifying mens rea as a
traditional focus of the debate on felony murder).
148. People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Cal. 1971) (quoting People v.
Lovato, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638, 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)). The court further explained
that allowing such an illogical conclusion would “constitute an affront to the
judiciary which through the years has constantly striven to find compelling reasons
rather than arbitrary distinctions before making rules which result in differing
treatment of people.” Id. Although California employs the abstract test for
dangerousness, the charge still arises out of defendant’s status as a felon.
149. State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (Hudson,
J., dissenting), rev’d, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
150. See infra Part IV.D.
151. Referring to the remaining third-degree murder charges, the appellate
court noted, “[O]ur criminal code adequately encompasses the conduct at issue
here.” Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 375 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying note 2.
154. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 2003).
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155

conviction.
The court failed to recognize that absence of a
special danger in the abstract was not fatal under the Nunn
156
standard. Moreover, in the three cases the court cited in support
of its conclusion, the lack of danger in the abstract was not
157
Instead, the dangerous circumstances under
determinative.
which the felonies were committed were acknowledged, and the
158
felony-murder rule was applied.
B. The Court Misapplied the Law
Had the court strictly applied the Nunn standard as it had
previously, the appellate court ruling and the felony-murder charge
would have been affirmed. Under the Nunn standard, all of
Anderson’s actions while possessing the gun can be properly
159
The Nunn standard
considered as part of the underlying felony.
called for the court to consider “not just the elements of the felony
in the abstract but the facts of the particular case and the
160
circumstances under which the felony was committed.” Anderson
was in possession of the gun at the time it was fired. While
possession of a gun by a felon in the abstract may not be
dangerous, it certainly became so when Anderson placed it inches
161
from the victim’s head.
Applying the same standard that the Minnesota Supreme
Court purported to apply, the Georgia Supreme Court found
162
possession of a firearm by an ex-felon to be inherently dangerous.
The Georgia court ruled on similar facts to those involved in
Anderson, and their decision demonstrates the proper analysis

155. Id.
156. State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980) (describing the
standard as having dual considerations).
157. State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996) (applying the felony-murder
doctrine despite a lack of danger in the abstract); State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273
(Minn. 1983) (applying the felony-murder doctrine despite questionable danger
in the abstract); Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1980) (felony-murder doctrine
applied despite questionable danger in the abstract).
158. Cole, 542 N.W.2d at 53; Back, 341 N.W.2d at 277; Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 754.
159. Possession is by nature a “continuing crime.” See, e.g., People v. Ford, 388
P.2d 892, 908 (Cal. 1964), overruled by People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1971)
(determining that possession of a firearm was not dangerous in the abstract).
160. The court seems to be implying that the lack of a formula for combining
both tests leaves open the option to consider either.
161. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Minn. 2003) (Gilbert, J.,
dissenting).
162. Metts v. State, 511 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. 1999).
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under the standard. A felony-murder charge will be upheld in
Georgia where the underlying felony is “dangerous per se or . . .
create[s] a foreseeable risk of death when the attendant
163
circumstances [are] taken into account.”
In Metts v. State, the
defendant, a felon in possession of a firearm, shot the victim
through a second-story window after twice demanding that the
164
person in the window leave.
The evidence showed that the
defendant had pointed a cocked and loaded gun at a window
knowing there was someone on the other side, and thus
defendant’s possession of a firearm was deemed dangerous and life
165
In light of the circumstances, the felony supported
threatening.
166
a felony-murder charge.
C. Lack of Guidance
167

The
The Nunn standard calls for two considerations.
168
Either the court
Minnesota Supreme Court utilized only one.
changed the standard by which it rules upon proper predicate
felonies, or it failed to explain a major omission within its current
scheme. The Anderson court never claimed to be changing the
Nunn standard. In fact, the court was extremely clear in its
169
insistence that this decision was to follow prior precedent.
The
court cited the Nunn standard no less than six times, each time
maintaining that the standard called for consideration of the felony
170
both in the abstract and in the context of its commission.
The court specifically stated, “Contrary to the implications set
forth in the dissent, we are not writing on a clean slate. We cannot,
and should not, ignore our precedent interpreting Minnesota’s
felony-murder statute in order to render an opinion reaching a
171
different result.” Ironically, the court proceeded to do just that.
After taking pains to reinvigorate the dual nature of its
analysis, the court went on to focus singularly upon the unlawful
163. Id. at 510.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980) (describing the
abstract and circumstances tests).
168. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
169. See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701 (stating that the court is applying the
“statute as previously interpreted” to the facts of this case).
170. Id. at 699-701.
171. Id. at 701 n.7.
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possession in the abstract. “Applying the statute as previously
interpreted,” the court held that “[b]ecause felon in possession of a
firearm and possession of a stolen firearm are not dangerous in the
abstract, these predicate felonies fail the special danger to human
172
life standard.”
The omission was particularly glaring in light of
the appellate court’s reliance upon the circumstances as the basis
173
for its holding and Justice Gilbert’s strong dissent emphasizing
174
the same.
D. Alternative Reasoning
The court should have taken the opportunity presented by the
facts in Anderson to change its existing law. Had the court desired
to create a standard to further limit the felony-murder rule in a
substantive way, the court should have expressly required that the
175
homicide be committed in “furtherance of the felony.”
The
change would have properly enabled the court to avoid charging
Anderson with felony-murder and would have provided a clear and
sustainable guide for future decisions.
The recognition of such a limitation would require a tighter
176
causal nexus between the felony and the homicide. The resulting
death must be “a consequence [of an] action which was directly
177
While the
intended to further the [predicate] felony.”
requirement has most often been used in situations involving
178
deaths caused by a third party, it has also been applied to deaths
179
caused by acts that were not “part of the criminal enterprise.”
172. Id. at 701.
173. See State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666
N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
174. See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 702 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
175. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 937 P.2d 310, 319 (Ariz. 1997) (“A death is in
furtherance of an underlying felony,” for purposes of felony murder, “if the death
resulted from an action taken to facilitate accomplishment of the felony.”).
176. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 70 (2004) (“The death need not be in
furtherance of the felony, but the act that caused the death should be in
furtherance of the felony.”).
177. King v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 704, 708 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). “In
short, whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the felony and the
homicide depends on whether the defendant’s felony dictated his conduct which
led to the homicide.” Griffin v. Commonwealth, 533 S.E.2d 653, 658 (Va. 2000)
(citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5 (1998)).
178. See, e.g., State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20 (N.J. 1977).
179. King, 368 S.E.2d at 706. King provides a clear illustration of this principle.
Two men flew a plane containing over 500 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 705. Due
to heavy fog, the pilot had his companion take control of the airplane while he
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It would be difficult to argue that the discharge of the firearm
in Anderson was “integral to the felony, or in direct furtherance of
180
or necessitated by the felony.”
This argument constituted much
181
Judge Hudson
of the appellate court dissent in Anderson.
objected to the appellate court ruling, arguing that “the discharge
of the gun, the act causing Rogers’ death, was not committed in
182
furtherance of the underlying felony of unlawful possession.”
The appellate majority recognized that “[Anderson] did not
commit the murder to further any of the underlying felonies,” but
183
did not find the consideration to be determinative.
The requirement would have proceeded naturally from recent
184
Minnesota decisions working with the felony-murder rule.
In
Nunn, the homicide was caused by a physical beating that was
185
In Back, the
administered in an attempt to complete a burglary.
same firearm shots that caused the felony damage to property also
186
caused the homicide.
The defendant in Cole intentionally shot a
187
Anderson did
police officer to avoid arrest for his felony theft.
not use the firearm to further his unlawful possession. Finally,
comparing the unlawful possession in Anderson to the dangerous
theft in Cole, the dissenting judge pointed out that “Cole purposely
shot the police officer to evade arrest; here [Anderson]
188
accidentally shot the victim.”
Instead of attacking the problem directly and requiring a
tighter causal nexus between the felony and the resulting death,
the Anderson court simply ignored the dangerous circumstances
portion of its analysis and evaluated the possession in the abstract

attempted to navigate. Id. The plane hit a mountain, and the companion died.
Id. As a result, defendant was charged with felony murder based on possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that
the crash was not a foreseeable result of the felony nor made more likely by the
fact that the plane cargo was illegal. Id. at 708.
180. Id. at 708.
181. See State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 372-75 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(Hudson, J., dissenting), rev’d, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
182. Id. at 374.
183. Id. at 371.
184. Id. at 374 (suggesting that the “in furtherance” requirement was adhered
to in Cole and Back).
185. State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 752 (Minn. 1980).
186. State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 274 (Minn. 1983).
187. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 374 (discussing State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43
(Minn. 1996)).
188. Id. at 375.
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189

V. CONCLUSION
In recognizing the abstract test as capable of standing alone
and according it determinative weight, the court effectively added a
new tool to its capacity to control which felonies may be utilized for
190
conviction under the felony-murder doctrine. Having recognized
both the abstract and the circumstances test, without constraining
itself with a standard for reconciling them, the court had only to
191
choose between them to determine the outcome.
By focusing
singularly on the abstract test in Anderson, the court made its
judgment that neither felony is a proper predicate for felonymurder, but left the lower courts with very little guidance on how
192
and when to duplicate its reasoning.
The Minnesota Supreme Court did come to the correct result
in Anderson by declining to allow a charge of second-degree felonymurder. Rather than changing the law in Minnesota, the court
simply reinterpreted its prior precedent, leaving several issues
193
Foremost among them is the scope of the court’s
unaddressed.
holding. Although the court has limited the immediate scope of its
holding to felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen
194
firearm, the court offered little explanation for what it had done.
Because the court has yet to prescribe a rule for the interaction of
the abstract and the circumstances tests, lower courts will
temporarily find themselves with greater decision-making power
and less guidance for using it.

189. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
190. Id.
191. Had the majority taken the dissent’s broader view of the felony, the court
could easily have found the requisite danger. In particular, the dissent faults the
majority for overlooking the “realities of the situation” and declared that “[t]his
case involves exactly the inherently dangerous situation the legislature
envisioned.” Id. at 702 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
192. See id.
193. See supra Part IV.B.
194. See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).
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